Nixon and Kissinger's Private Banter With Brezhnev and Mao

President Richard M. Nixon went to China. Henry A. Kissinger came along. They talked with Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his aides of war, peace, sex, death and the incendiary powers of the potent rice liquor known as mao tai.

When Kissinger stepped down as secretary of state in 1977, he took reams of documents and sought to seal them until after his death. But the National Security Archive, a research group in Washington, tracked down records of his talks in the 1970s with Chinese and Soviet leaders like Mao and Leonid Brezhnev in pursuit of diplomacy and detente. They will be published this month as "The Kissinger Transcripts" (The New Press).

Here is the first thaw of the Cold War -- the old-time communists chatting amiably and talking tough with the Americans. In these talks of a quarter-century past, there are resonances with the present -- presidential scandal, Chinese spying and Russian intrigues. There are also touching moments as the Americans try to cozy up to the cantankerous Brezhnev and the chilly mountain of the dying Mao.

Feb. 21, 1972, Mao's residence: The first ice-breaking meeting between Nixon and Mao, arranged through Kissinger's secret negotiations. Mao wants to talk philosophy, not politics.

Nixon: I have read the chairman's poems and speeches, and I knew he was a professional philosopher. (The Chinese laugh.)

Mao (looking at Kissinger): He is a doctor of philosophy?

Nixon: He is a doctor of brains.

Mao: What about asking him to be the main speaker today?

Nixon: He is an expert in philosophy.

Kissinger: I used to assign the chairman's collective writings to my classes at Harvard.

Mao: Those writings of mine aren't anything. There is nothing instructive in what I wrote.

Nixon: The chairman's writings moved a nation and have changed the world.

Mao: I haven't been able to change it. I've only been able to change a few places in the vicinity of Beijing. . . . We two must not monopolize the whole show. It won't do if we don't let Kissinger have a say. You have been famous about your trips to China.

Kissinger: It was the president who set the direction. . . .

Nixon: He is a very wise assistant to say it that way. (Mao laughs).

Mao: He is praising you, saying you are clever.

Nixon: He doesn't look like a secret agent. He is the only man in captivity who could go to Paris 12 times and Peking once and no one knew it except possibly a couple of pretty girls. (Prime Minister Chou En-lai laughs.) . . . Anyone who uses pretty girls as a cover must be the greatest diplomat of all time.

Mao (who had had many concubines): So your girls are very often made use of?

Nixon: His girls, not mine. It would get me into great trouble if I used girls as a cover.

Chou (laughing): Especially during elections.

Feb. 17-18, 1973, Mao's residence: A midnight meeting. Mao, fading in and out of logical discourse, talks about spies, war and heaven. The Briton he refers to is the World War II field marshal General Bernard Law Montgomery.

Mao: I don't look bad, but God has sent me an invitation.

There was someone in the British army who was opposed to the independence of your country. . . . He probably doesn't oppose you anymore. At that time, you also opposed us. We also opposed you. So we are two enemies (laughter).

Kissinger: Two former enemies.

Mao: Now we call the relationship between ourselves a friendship.

Kissinger: That's our sentiment.

Mao: That's what I am saying. . . . But let us not speak false words or engage in trickery. We don't steal your documents. You can deliberately leave them somewhere and try us out. Nor do we engage in eavesdropping and bugging. There is no use in those small tricks. And some of the big maneuverings, there is no use to them, too. . . . Your CIA is not good for major events.

Kissinger: That's absolutely true. That's been our experience.

Mao: You want information on a certain question, then the intelligence reports come in as so many snowflakes. We also have our intelligence service and it is the same with them. (Chou laughs.)

Later, Mao wonders if Washington wants Moscow to attack China. The Chinese, like the Americans, were worried that the Soviets might launch a war for world domination.

Mao: If there are Russians planning to attack China . . . perhaps you can begin to help them.

Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, it is really very important that we understand each other's motives. We will never knowingly cooperate in an attack on China.

Mao (interrupting): No, that's not so. Your aim in doing that would be to bring the Soviet Union down.

Kissinger: That's a very dangerous thing. (Laughter.)

Mao: The goal of the Soviet Union is to occupy both Europe and Asia, the two continents.

Kissinger: We want to discourage a Soviet attack, not defeat it. We want to prevent it.

Mao: As for things, matters, in the world, it is hard to say. . . . I'm not afraid of anything. Anyway, God has sent me an invitation.

April 14, 1974, dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping. Kissinger toasts him in the Chinese manner -- repeatedly.

Kissinger: I think if we drink enough mao tai we can solve anything.

Deng: Then when I go back to China, I must increase production of it.

Kissinger: You know, when the president came back from China, he wanted to show his daughter how potent mao tai was. So he took out a bottle and poured it into a saucer and lit it, but the glass bowl broke and the mao tai ran over the table and the table began to burn! So you nearly burned down the White House!

Kissinger offers toasts to Mao and guests.

Deng: Why is there still such a big noise being made about Watergate?

Kissinger: That is a series of almost incomprehensible events. . . . When I first met the prime minister I spoke of China as the land of mystery. Now the U.S. must seem a very mysterious country.

Deng: Such an issue is really incomprehensible to us.

Kissinger: It has its roots in the fact that some mistakes were made, but also, when you change many policies, you make many, many enemies.

March 25, 1974, the Kremlin: Kissinger talks with Brezhnev about MIRVs, new missiles capable of carrying 10 independently targeted nuclear warheads. Brezhnev fiddles with a dome-shaped brass object on his desk that pops open to reveal six brass cartridges pointed upward.

Kissinger: Is that a MIRV? (Laughter.)

Brezhnev: No, it's for cigarettes. It's more peaceful than it looks.

Kissinger: One of our intelligence experts will now say we know there are six MIRVs on the Soviet missiles.

Brezhnev: It's what we do for friendship.

Kissinger: It's much better than our intelligence.

As the talks continue, so do the jokes.

Brezhnev: Why spoil this very friendly atmosphere? It is not in the interests of either side. (Tea is brought in. Brezhnev counts the lemon slices.) How many warheads here? One, two, three -- six! You tested one like this. . . .

Kissinger: On those you can put five or six warheads now and God knows how many later.

Brezhnev: The same God doesn't know how many you can install. You have missiles carrying 10 already. We don't have any yet. So even today, each one of yours equals two of ours. . . .

Kissinger: What are 3,000 MIRVs among friends? (Laughter.)

Oct. 24, 1974, the Kremlin: Brezhnev, gravely ill, talks of Armageddon.

Brezhnev: Do you believe or admit of the possibility of atomic war between our two nations? Or the possibility of atomic war anywhere in the world? . . . . On that thought, I wish you pleasant dreams.

Kissinger: Without hearing my answer?

Brezhnev: No, not today.

Kissinger: But suspense will make you very sleepless.

Brezhnev: No, I'll sleep.

Oct. 21, 1975, Mao's residence: the Great Helmsman prepares to meet his maker.

Mao: I am going to heaven soon. . . . And when I . . . see God, I'll tell him it's better to have Taiwan under the care of the United States now.

Kissinger: He'll be very astonished to hear that from the chairman.

Mao: No, because God blesses you, not us. (Mao waves his hands.) God does not like us because I am a militant warlord, also a communist. That's why he doesn't like me. He likes you.

Kissinger: I've never had the pleasure of meeting him, so I don't know. . . .

Mao: As for military aspects, we should not discuss that now. Such matters should wait until war breaks out before we consider them.

Kissinger: Yes, but you should know that we are prepared to consider them.