PAULA CORBIN JONES, * * Plaintiff, * * vs. * No. LR-C-94-290 * WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON * and DANNY FERGUSON, * * Defendants. * *
On or about March 20, 1998, Defendant Clinton filed his Motion to Strike Materials Filed By Plaintiff In Connection With Her Opposition to Summary Judgment (the "Motion") requesting this Court to strike significant, relevant summary judgment evidence submitted by Plaintiff in opposition to Defendant Clinton's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "MSJ"). Plaintiff hereby responds to and opposes this Motion on the following grounds.
I. Under the guise of a motion to strike, Defendant Clinton misused his pleading as a vehicle by which to file certain materials in the public record in bad faith and in his continuing attempt to try this case in the press and not in the courtroom. The Court should deny his Motion for this reason alone. Defendant Clinton realized that he could not file his objectionable materials as part of his formal Reply to Plaintiffs Response to his MSJ because such a filing would constitute a blatant admission that numerous genuine issues of material fact exist involving his MSJ, an admission that would automatically result in denial of the MSJ under Rule 56(c).
2. The Motion seeks to convince the Court to strike the following Exhibits from Plaintiff's Appendix In Opposition to Defendant Clinton's Motion for Summary Judgment, all of which materials were properly attached to Plaintiff's Response in good faith: Exhibit 1 (Declaration of Paula Jones); Exhibit 4 (Declaration of Dolly Kyle Browning); Exhibit 5 (Deposition of Dolly Kyle Browning); Exhibit 6 (Declaration of John Thompson); Exhibit 7 (Declaration of Gennifer G. Flowers); Exhibit 8 (Deposition of Gennifer Flowers); Exhibit 9 (Deposition of Jane Doe #2); Exhibit 10 (Declaration of James A. Fisher); Exhibit 11 (Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Additional Discovery of Kathleen Willey and Nathan Landow); Exhibit 12 (Deposition of Kathleen Willey); Exhibit 13 (Declaration of Linda Tripp); Exhibit 14 (Plaintiff's Reply Memo In Support of Her Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Additional Discovery of Kathleen Willey and Nathan Landow); Exhibit 15 (Deposition of Judy Stokes); Exhibit 16 (Deposition of Larry Patterson); Exhibit 17 (Deposition of L. D. Brown); Exhibit 18 (Deposition of Roger Perry); Exhibit 23 (Order of the Court Compelling Defendant Clinton to Answer Interrogatories); Exhibit 24 (Defendant Clinton's Supplemental Responses to Plaintiffs Second Interrogatories); Exhibit 25 (Defendant Clinton's Supplemental Responses to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions); and Exhibit 29 (Declaration of Patrick J. Carries). The Motion alleges that it is grounded upon Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(f) and 37; however, even a surface perusal of these Rules demonstrates that they have no applicability whatsoever to the instant situation.
3. Rule 37 on its face provides sanctions only for discovery abuse, such as a party failing to comply with a valid discovery order, failing to respond to valid discovery requests, or failing to attend a deposition. Rule 37(a)-(d). Defendant Clinton has not even alleged any such discovery abuse in his Motion at bar. Rule 12(f) provides that if a party files a motion to strike before responding to an opposing party's pleading, the court may strike from such pleading any "insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." The current Motion does not meet the first facial requirements of this Rule since the Motion was not filed before Defendant Clinton filed his Reply to Plaintiff's Response to his MSJ; it was filed on the same day, and Plaintiff's Response is not a "pleading" in this Rule 12 sense. Moreover, the only claim made in the Motion that could arguably fit within Rule 12(f) is that the above-referenced Exhibits are "immaterial" to the summary judgment issues. Motion at 1. As will be demonstrated below, all of the challenged Exhibits are highly material and directly relevant to the summary judgment issues raised in the MSJ and in Plaintiff's Response thereto. Moreover, such motions to strike are not favored in the law, North Penn Transfer, Inc. v. Victaulic Co. of America, 859 F. Supp. 154 (W.D. Pa. 1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Scaletty, 8 10 F. Supp. 1505 (E. D. Kan. 1992), and they should be denied unless the allegations can have no possible relation to the controversy. Augustus v. Board of Public Instruction 306 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1962); Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1976) (motion to strike matter allegedly immaterial will be denied unless it can be shown that no evidence in support of the allegations would be admissible). All of the questioned Exhibits are directly relevant to the issues in controversy in the MSJ and present proper, competent My admissible summary judgment evidence, as manifested below.
The Exhibits Relate Directly to Plaintiff's §§ 1983 and 1985 Claims, Which the MSJ Argues Must Be Dismissed
4. Defendant Clinton's MSJ contends that, even if Plaintiff's version of the facts is accepted, such allegations do not rise to the level of a §§ 1983 or 1985 civil-rights violation. MSJ Memorandum at 3. Plaintiff has argued in response that Defendants' conduct set out in her factual allegations, as proven by her summary judgment evidence, constitutes violations of Arkansas criminal statutes outlawing sexual abuse and harassment (and criminal attempts at same) such that Defendants unconstitutionally discriminated against Plaintiff because of her gender by sexually harassing and assaulting her and conspiring to accomplish same. In paragraphs 53, 60, 64, and 67- 69 of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (the "Complaint"), which is expressly incorporated herein by reference under Rule 10(c), Plaintiff plainly asserted that Defendants violated her civil rights through sexual assault abuse, and harassment outlawed by Arkansas criminal law. Exhibits I and 16-18 present competent summary judgment evidence directly relating to these § § 1983 and 1985 claims of intentional discrimination against Plaintiff because of her sex, Defendants' conspiracy to effect same, and the damage to Plaintiffs person that resulted directly therefrom. The Declaration of Paula Jones explains in detail. the physical assault and battery and sexual assault; abuse, and harassment perpetrated against her by Defendants, providing such details as Defendant Clinton's temporary physical restraint and prevention of Plaintiff from leaving the Excelsior Hotel room and Defendant Ferguson's presence outside the hotel room door armed with a loaded pistol. Plaintiff's Declaration also explains the emotional damage, harm, and distress that she suffered as a direct result of this assault, including feelings of horror, emotional distress, nervousness, fear, fright, severe embarrassment, humiliation, grief, shame, and anxiety. These same allegations are set forth in paragraph 57 of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. The Declaration of Patrick I Carnes, Ph.D., about which Defendant Clinton complains vigorously in his Motion, is clearly "material" and relates directly to his professional, expert opinion that Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress as a result of Defendants' abusive conduct against her. Dr. Carnes lists several subcategories of Plaintiff's severe emotional distress, including extreme anxiety, intrusive thoughts and memories, and consequent sexual aversion. Defendant Clinton and his counsel have fixated upon the last subpart of this list; that is, the sexual aversion component of emotional distress, and complain that this testimony requires exclusion of the entire Carnes Declaration. Of course, this argument is specious because Plaintiff has always maintained and continues to announce that she is not seeking damages from Defendants for sexual aversion or loss of consortium, and Plaintiff is quite willing to enter into a formal stipulation to this effect at the appropriate time in this proceeding. Tie balance of the Carnes Declaration obviously deals directly with Plaintiff's summary judgment evidence of emotional distress, harm, and damages, all of which Defendant Clinton's MSJ claims do not exist. Thus, this Declaration responds directly to the no-damage allegation put in issue by the MSJ. The depositions of troopers Patterson, Brown, and Perry provide further relevant evidence of Defendants' custom, usage, habit pattern, and practice of intentionally discriminating against numerous females on the basis of their sex in a fashion similar to that encountered by Plaintiff, and these depositions present compelling evidence that Defendant Ferguson was very much aware of these practices of Defendant Clinton since, at the very least, Defendant Ferguson participated with these other troopers in their discussions in the guardhouse describing numerous such instances. This summary judgment evidence obviously relates directly to Plaintiff's s § § 1983 and 1985 civil rights and conspiracy allegations, which the MSJ seeks to have dismissed.
5. The challenged Exhibits also present direct summary judgment evidence that Defendant Clinton, in committing these civil rights offenses, has violated Arkansas criminal law outlawing sexual abuse and harassment and attempts at same. Arkansas Code Annotated 5-71-208 defines such harassment as conduct committed with the purpose to harass, annoy, or alarm another person involving touching such a person and subjecting her to offensive physical contact or attempts at same or conduct that seriously annoys another person and serves no legitimate purpose. Such criminal conduct is defined as a Class A misdemeanor. Similarly, Arkansas Code Annotated 5-14- 108 defines sexual abuse as any sexual contact with another person by forcible compulsion, a Class C felony, and sexual contact is defined as any act of sexual gratification involving the touching, directly or through clothing, of the sex organs, buttocks, or breast of a female. Id. 5-14-101. Moreover, any attempt to commit such illegal sexual contact itself constitutes the offense of "criminal attempt, - a Class D felony in this instance Arkansas Code Annotated 5-3-201, 5.3-203(4). The above referenced Exhibits present compelling evidence that Defendant Clinton, at the very least attempted to engage in prohibited sexual contact by running his hands up Plaintiff's thighs, without her consent, in the attempt to reach her middle pelvic area, thus committing, at the very least a Class D felony of attempted sexual abuse and a Class A misdemeanor of offensive sexual harassment. This same summary judgment evidence also fits the definition under Federal Ride of Evidence 413(d) of "sexual assault," meaning an attempt or conspiracy to contact, without consent, the genitals of another person.
6. Accordingly, these referenced Exhibits relate directly to Plaintiff's §§ 1983 and 1985 civil-rights claims of discrimination against Plaintiff on the basis of her sex, and this summary judgment evidence directly contravenes the MSJ's arguments to dismiss these counts.
The Exhibits Are Eminently Material to Plaintiff's Suppression-of-Evidence, Perjury, and Obstruction-of-Justice MSJ Response Demonstrating That Defendant Clinton's Entire Defensive Case and MSJ Are Weak and Unfounded
7. The next set of challenged Exhibits presents summary judgment evidence relating directly to Plaintiff's suppression-of-evidence, perjury, and obstruction-of-justice response to Defendant Clinton's motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims. These Exhibits include the deposition and declaration of Dolly Kyle Browning, the declaration of John Thompson, the declaration and deposition of Gennifer Flowers, Plaintiff's pleadings concerning additional discovery of Kathleen Willey, the deposition of Judy Stokes, and Defendant Clinton's fallacious responses to Plaintiff's interrogatories and request for admissions.1
8. Defendant Clinton seems riot to comprehend the seriousness of Plaintiff's argument concerning his suppression-of-evidence, perjury, and obstruction-of-justice campaign in this case and the crucial relevance of Plaintiff's summary judgment materials regarding same. As fully briefed in Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant Clinton's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Response") at § IV thereof, a party's or his agents' attempts to conceal and suppress evidence, commit or suborn perjury tamper with witnesses, or obstruct justice constitute admissible evidence to be treated as a legal admission that his entire case is weak and unfounded. The Motion fails to address this legal precept at all, and even his MSJ Reply adduces not a single primary or secondary legal authority to controvert this prevailing legal precept. In order to educate more fully Defendant Clinton and his counsel concerning the seriousness of this argument and to demonstrate conclusively the relevance and admissibility of Plaintiff's summary judgment evidence in this regard, Plaintiff has conducted the following brief but detailed legal and factual analysis of her summary judgment evidence yielding the following results.
9. Perjury is defined to occur whenever a person, having taken an oath in any federal court proceeding that he will testify truthfully, willfully and contrary to such oath states any material matter which he does not believe to be true or when a person willfully subscribes, in a declaration or verification given under penalty of perjury, as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true. 18 U.S.C. § 1621. Similarly, subornation of perjury is defined to occur whenever one person procures another person to commit any perjury 18 U.S.C. § 1622. Moreover, a perjurious false declaration is defined to occur whenever a person under oath (or in any declaration or verification made under penalty of perjury) in any proceeding ancillary to any federal court knowingly makes any false material declaration or uses any other information or document knowing same to contain any false material declaration 18 U.S.C. § 1623.
10. Witness tampering is defined to occur whenever a person knowingly uses intimidation or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person with intent to: influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person; cause any person to withhold testimony, documents, or objects or conceal an object with intent to impair its availability for use in an official proceeding; or cause any person to be absent from an official proceeding to which that person has been summoned. 18 U.S.C. § 1512. For these purposes, "corruptly persuade" means to persuade with an improper purpose or intent, United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1997), and any endeavor to influence a witness improperly falls within the connotation of "corruptly." Broadbent v. United States, 149 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1945). The term "misleading conduct" includes knowingly making a false statement, intentionally omitting information from a statement, or intentionally concealing a material fact. 18 U.S. C. § 1515(a)(3). Thus, a defendant does not have to go so far as to expressly "tell a witness to lie" in order to commit the crimes of witness tampering and subornation of perjury.
11. Obstruction of justice is defined to occur whenever a person corruptly endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice in any federal court. 18 U,S,C. § 1503(a). Witness tampering is definitely included in the concept of obstruction of justice, United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1995), and this concept also covers attempted corruption of a prospective witness in a civil action pending in federal district court. Roberts v. United States, 239 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1956). The term "corruptly" has the same meaning as defined above. Where one person agrees with another witness falsely to arrange to have a medical emergency in order to avoid trial proceedings, those persons have obstructed justice. United States v. Minkoff, 137 F-2d 402 (2d Cir. 1943). Moreover, a perjurious witness can also be guilty of obstruction of justice if his testimony is evasive or false by deliberately concealing knowledge and blocking the flow of truthful information. United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979). Furthermore, an attorney commits obstruction of justice by having his client-witness knowingly testify falsely on material subjects. United Slates v. Root, 366 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967). If a party sends a witness out of the country to keep the witness from responding to a subpoena, the party has obstructed justice, Heinze v. United States, 181 F. 322 (2d Cir. 1910), and if a party induces a witness to secrete herself in order to prevent her attendance as a witness, that party also commits obstruction of justice. Parsons v. United States 386 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 969 (1968); United States v. Schaffner, 715 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1983). Finally, a person who endeavors to prevent a witness under subpoena from testifying obstructs justice. United States v. Marionneaux, 514 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1975).
12. A party is equally guilty of obstruction of justice when he uses an intermediary to approach a witness and endeavor to influence that witness. Laughlin v. United States, 3 85 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968). Additionally, a party's attempt to conceal documents or things which have been subpoenaed constitutes obstruction of justice, United States v. Curcio, 279 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960), and obstruction of justice includes a party's attempt to conceal subpoenaed documents or things by removing them from one location to another even though the date of compliance with the subpoena has been temporarily extended. United States v. Lench, 806 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986). Of course, conspiracy to commit any of the above offenses (perjury, subornation of perjury, witness tampering, or obstruction of justice) itself constitutes the additional criminal offense of conspiracy. 18 U.S.C. § 371.
13. Applying the required summary judgment standard or burden of proof that all Plaintiff's facts are to be believed and all of her evidence to be construed in the light most favorable to her and that all reasonable inferences must be indulged for the benefit of Plaintiff, 2 and implementing the above definitions as to Plaintiffs summary judgment evidence so interpreted, one can discern that this evidence demonstrates that Defendant Clinton and his agents, directly and through intermediaries, have committed numerous counts of suppression of evidence, perjury, subornation of perjury, witness-tampering, and obstruction of justice.
14. With the above explanation of the seriousness of Plaintiff's suppression-of-evidence argument and the consequent legal admission by Defendant Clinton that his entire case is unfounded and weak, it becomes apparent that challenged Exhibits 4-18 and 23-25 relate directly to this argument. That is, the deposition and declaration of Ms. Browning, the declaration of Mr. Thompson, the declaration and deposition of Ms. Flowers, the pleadings and declarations involving Ms. Willey, Ms. Tripp, and Ms. Lewinsky, the deposition of Ms. Stokes, and the trooper depositions all detail both the damaging evidence that Defendant Clinton and his agents sought to suppress and the specific conduct undertaken by them to effect such perjurious suppression and obstruction. Obviously, these Exhibits cannot be stricken as they are highly "material" to Plaintiff's unchallenged suppression-of-evidence claim, Regarding the Motion's complaint (at 3) that certain of Plaintiffs Exhibits contain summary judgment evidence relating to Ms. Lewinsky, Plaintiff intends to file a petition for writ of mandamus on the issues of discovery and admission of this evidence, and Plaintiff currently contemplates that this mandamus pleading will be filed early in the week of March 30, 1998. Plaintiff hopes that a ruling by the Eighth Circuit will restore the Lewinsky evidence to this case. In any event, the Lewinsky material presented by the challenged Exhibits all relates to suppression-of-evidence and obstruction-of-justice conduct by Defendant Clinton and his agents before the January 29, 1998 original order excluding the Lewinsky evidence from future use by Plaintiff. Accordingly, all such suppression activities and evidence occurring before that January 29 date are highly relevant to Plaintiff's suppression-of-evidence argument, and not a single legal authority to the contrary has been proffered by Defendant Clinton.
Further Suppression-of-Evidence and Discovery-Abuse Malfeasance by Defendant Clinton Dictates That the Motion Should Be Denied
15. Additional instances of Defendant Clinton's vast suppression-of-evidence and "discovery-abuse campaign have come to light after Plaintiff filed her MSJ Response and Defendant Clinton filed the Motion at bar.
16. For example, in response to Kathleen Willey's gripping narrative, presented on TV's 60 Minutes show of March 15, 1998, of her sexual assault 3 at the hands of Defendant Clinton within inches of the Oval Office while seeking federal government employment during a time of great personal and financial hardship, Defendant Clinton and his agents at the White House released, less than 12 hours later, more than 15 handwritten letters of Ms. Willey to Defendant Clinton and White House records of numerous telephone calls between Ms. Willey and Defendant Clinton. See Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein (news reports from week of March 16, 1998 reporting White House release of such documents); Exhibit B attached hereto and incorporated herein (exemplars of actual Willey/Clinton documents released). These documents were released to disparage Ms. Willey and attack her credibility, following the typical Defendant Clinton and White House modus operandi of stonewalling legitimate discovery and information requests when the evidence sought would be harmful to Defendant Clinton and then selectively leaking such documents and information when the evidence might be helpful. This particular instance leaps beyond the pale of such typical stonewalling and into the bounds of gross discovery abuse, suppression of evidence, and obstruction of justice because these precise documents had previously been demanded by Plaintiff through discovery in this case, and Defendant Clinton and his counsel adamantly denied that any such documents existed.
17. In the Second Set of Requests From Plaintiff to Defendant Clinton for Production of Documents and Things (the "Second Document Requests") served upon Defendant Clinton on December 15, 1997, Plaintiff sought, in Request No. 5, all documents concerning Kathleen Willey, including all correspondence and communications relating to any federal governmental employment, appointments, or duties obtained or sought by Ms. Willey and all telephone records or logs reflecting any meetings or visits involving Defendant Clinton and Ms. Willey. Exhibit C at 6, attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference (true and correct copies of excerpts of such Second Document Requests). By Defendant Clinton's Responses to Plaintiff's Second Set of Document Requests certified as served on January 15, 1999, Defendant Clinton responded: "Notwithstanding the above objections, President Clinton has no such documents responsive to this Request. Also notwithstanding the above objections, the Clinton Campaign has no such documents responsive to this Request." Exhibit D at 11, attached hereto and incorporated herein (excerpts from Defendant Clinton's Responses to Plaintiffs Second Set of Document Requests). A facial examination of the documents contained in Exhibit B hereto and released by Defendant Clinton and the White House on March 16 demonstrate the outright mendacity of this response. For example, two of such documents clearly constitute written telephone records recording telephone calls to Defendant Clinton from Ms. Willey, and another document represents a copy of a July 28, 1995 letter from Defendant Clinton regarding Ms. Willey's daughter. Exhibit B. Moreover, this Court should not countenance any arguments by Defendant Clinton or his counsel that they did not understand Plaintiff's Second Document Requests to include "White House documents" or Campaign documents, since Ms. Amy Sabrin, one of Defendant Clinton's counsel of record herein, for-warded to the undersigned by her letter of February 25, 1998 two very similar documents (consisting of a December 21, 1995 letter from Defendant Clinton to Ms. Willey on "Bill Clinton" letterhead indicated as paid for by the Clinton Campaign and a December 5, 1995 letter from Ms. Willey to Defendant Clinton), admitting that these two documents were "responsive to plaintiffs document request to President Clinton." Exhibit E attached hereto and incorporated herein. Indeed, the letter from Ms. Willey produced by Ms. Sabrin bearing bates numbers CC-01041-01043 is precisely the same document as the December 5, 1995 letter from Ms. Willey to Defendant Clinton suddenly released by the White House on March 16, 1998. Exhibit B.
18. Such an outright, intentional failure by Defendant Clinton and his agents fully to comply with their document-production obligations in this case constitutes gross discovery abuse and further intentional suppression of evidence against Plaintiff, particularly in light of the March 16 politically motivated gush of Willey documents to the national media and the general public. On this ground alone, the Court should deny outright the instant Motion. Plaintiff hereby informs the Court that this abusive conduct will be the subject of a separate motion for sanctions under Rule 37 presently being prepared by Plaintiff and expected to be filed within the near future.
19. Moreover, as demonstrated by Exhibit F attached hereto and incorporated herein (the Declaration of T. Wesley Holmes identifying documentary material obtained in the factual investigation of this action concerning witness Phillip Yoakum) and Exhibit G attached hereto and incorporated herein (Sworn Declaration of Beverly Lambert), significant evidence suggests that Defendant Clinton and his agents have exerted great efforts to suppress and obstruct testimony by [name withheld] that Defendant Clinton in the past forcibly raped and sexually assaulted (within the definitions of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 415) her and then bribed and/or intimidated her and her family into remaining silent about this outrage. [name withheld] admitted to Plaintiff's investigator that [name withheld] had suffered a "horrible thing" at the hands of Bill Clinton that she did not want to relive; that Mr. Clinton was "too vicious" to be impacted by this lawsuit; and that, based on [name withheld]'s experience, she believes Paula ]ones is telling the truth in this lawsuit. Exhibit G. Mr. Yoakum's documents recount that Mr. Clinton would provide "a couple of big favors" to [name withheld]'s husband to serve as the purchase "price for silence." Exhibit F at 3.
20. Of course, this evidence directly controverts Defendant Clinton's deposition pronouncement that: "in my lifetime I've never sexually harassed a woman ... I never have, and I wouldn't." Clinton Dep. at 205 (included as Exhibit 2 in the Appendix to Plaintiff's Response). Because of this and the above-catalogued continual stream of suppression of evidence and discovery abuse in this case, this Court should deny. outright the instant Motion and Defendant Clinton's MSJ as an appropriate sanction against Defendant Clinton and his agents.
21. As explicated above, neither Rule 12(f) nor Rule 37 authorizes this Court to strike the summary judgment materials contained 'in the Exhibits attached to Plaintiff's MSJ Response. Indeed, the applicable legal authorities indicate that motions to strike should rarely be granted and then only if the challenged materials could have no possible relation to the issues in controversy.
22. The arguments and authorities cited above manifestly dictate that the questioned Exhibits relate directly to Plaintiffs §§ 1983 and 1985 claims, which the MSJ seeks to have dismissed, and are highly material to Plaintiff's suppression-of-evidence, perjury, and obstruction-of-justice claim advanced in her Response. Furthermore, additional recently discovered suppression-of-evidence and discovery-abuse conduct perpetrated by Defendant Clinton and his agents dictates that both the Motion and Defendant Clinton's MSJ itself should be denied as an appropriate sanction.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays that Defendant Clinton's Motion to Strike and MSJ be denied in all things and die Plaintiff be awarded such other and further relief, or general, at law or in equity, to which she is justly entitled.
Donovan Campbell, Jr.
1. With respect to Plaintiff's discovery pleadings regarding Kathleen Willey and Defendant Clinton's interrogatory and admission responses, Rule 56(c) facially authorizes such "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions" to be submitted in opposing motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, no further authority is required to sustain the introduction of these documents as competent summary judgment evidence. In addition the depositions and declarations of Ms. Browning and Ms. Flowers present summary judgment evidence properly probative of Plaintiff's jobs-for-sex argument within her § 1983 and § 1985 equal-protection violation claims, and the deposition of Ms. Willey constitutes competent evidence of Plaintiff's jobs-for-sex and jobs-for-silence claims comprehended by Plaintiff's § 1983 and § 1985 constitutional claims and her suppression-of-evidence argument Since the MSJ seeks to dismiss both of these constitutional claims wholesale, such summary judgment evidence is clearly "material" to Plaintiff's Response.
2. This standard is analogous to the legal standard for a grand jury to issue an indictment on a criminal charge, which standard requires only that evidence be presented sufficient to show probable cause that the elements of the criminal offense have been committed, See United States v. Brooks, 125 F.3 d 484, 497 (7th Cir. 1997); United Slates v. Fern, 117 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 1997).
3. Federal Rule of Evidence 413(d) defines "sexual assault" to include any contact by a male defendant without consent of the female, between the genitals of the male defendant and any part of the female's body (such as her hand) or any attempt to engage in such conduct, and this Rule further includes in its sexual assault definition any conduct proscribed by Chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code. 18 U.S.C. § 2244 of said chapter 109A defines "abusive sexual contact" as any person, in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States (such as the White House) knowingly engaging in sexual contact with another person without her permission, and sexual contact means the intentional touching, directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, breast inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse, harass, degrade, or arouse the sexual desire of any person. 18 U.S.C. 2245(3).
Here is: Affidavit of Juanita Broaddrick denying non-consensual sex with President Clinton .
UPDATE: Federal Judge Reprimands Jones lawyers for revealing the identity of Broaddrick: Jones Judge Warns About Witness Disclosure .
Jones Seeks Delay to Get Lewinsky Evidence .
JUDGE SLAPS PAULA LAWYERS FOR LEAKING NAMES .
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Eleanor Stacy Parker says Jordan helped land her White House job .
Here is the text of a published article about Clinton's Black Baby, including photographs of the mother and her child: Clinton's negro son.
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Order the Video of Clinton's Testimony.